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This study concerns the major clinical findings and theoretical concepts of Melanie Klein,
W. R. D. Fairbairn, and D. W. Winnicott in relation to Freud's theoretical elaboration of
psychical phenomena. A vague set of pronouncements early on in the book about the inter-
elationships of these investigators are later transformed into a highly lucid and interesting
account of the way in which clinical material in the analytic session reshaped the theoretical
domain of psychoanalysis after Freud's death.
The more exciting elements ofthe book include Hughes's linkage ofthe personal analyses of
Harry Guntrip with Fairbairn, and later with Winnicott (the former analysis is based on
Guntrip's lengthy unpublished record ofover 1,000 analytic sessions). A further dimension to
the inner workings of the psychoanalytic scene in Britain in the post-World War II era is
Hughes'sdiscussionofthecasestudyof'Susan'inMarionMilner'simportantbook Thehandsof
the living God (1969)-this patient lived in the Winnicott household for seven years during
Milner's treatment of her, and Winnicott's posthumously published The piggle provides, as
Hughes puts it, "clinical material bearing on the issues with which Milner's Susan had been
grappling for close to two decades".
Hughes's critical approach is refreshing, although not convincing in most places. For
example, whenshe refers to "thedownright sloppinessthatplaguedtheworkofMelanieKlein",
onefeels thatHugheshas notpreparedthegroundproperly. InthecontextofHughes'sanalysis,
the charge simply does not hold. But more serious problems abound in her discussions ofthe
development of Freud's instinct and structural theories.
HughesfocusesrightlyonthetheoreticalimportanceofFreud'sunfinishedandposthumously
published 'Projectfora scientificpsychology' (1895). But she seems oblivious tothefactthat the
roots of the instinct theory can be found in Freud's 'Project' (endogenous Q[uantity] is not
protected by a shieldagainststimuli), orthat itevolved throughthree specific stages. In thefirst,
the sexual and self-preservative (ego) instincts were given equal weight in shaping human
behaviour and experience; in the second, beginningwith the paper on narcissism (Freud, 1914),
the self-preservative instincts weredefined with reference to libido turningback onto theego; in
thethird, thedeathand lifeinstinctswereposited asfundamental(1920)and Freud returned full
circletoideasthatwereembeddedinthe'Project', especiallywithregard to theseparation oftwo
of the key psychical systems-memory and consciousness.
Hughesiscertainly sensitive to theissue ofthe English rendering of"instinct" fortheGerman
concept Trieb versus the more preferred use of"drive" by the English-speaking purists. But in
general she seems unacquainted with the current issues on the English translation of Freud,
although several important papers of Ormston published in the last decade are in her
bibliography. One significant item in the translation debates concerns Freud's structural
hypothesis. Ornston, forexample, supportsthepositionthat the so-called structural theory may
in fact be James Strachey's invention, not Freud's. As Strachey is given more than adequate
coverage as Freud's principal translator in the early chapters by Hughes, her unqualified
assumption that Freud's structural theory is a fundamental "paradigm" ofthe Freudian system
is a serious oversight.
Her strategy ofanalysing the differences between Freud's theoretical concepts and those of
Klein, Fairbairn, and Winnicott is not entirely successful because she does not prepare the
Freudian ground properly. On the other hand, the increasing interplay between clinical and
theoretical material after the chapters on Freud and Klein sustains attention to the very end.
R. Andrew Paskauskas, McGill University, Montreal
EDWARD M. HUNDERT, Philosophy, psychiatry and neuroscience: three approaches to the
mind. A synthetic analysis ofthe varieties ofhuman experience, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989,
8vo, pp. xiii, 346, illus., £30.00.
More than one commentator hasdefended the obscurity ofHegel'sphilosophical writings on
thegroundsthatthetruths with which he wasconcerned are themselvesinvincibly obscure. Any
book which claims to be an extension ofthe Hegelian programme is therefore unlikely to be an
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easy read. This oneis no exceptionthough it is unusual in that although intended primarily as a
contribution to philosophy its author is a young-ish American psychiatrist with academic
qualifications in other disciplines but, on the evidence ofthe book's extensive bibliography, no
previous publication other than a paper on ethical problem solving in medicine.
Dr Hundert's aimisnothing less than toexamine separately threeapproachestothemindand
then to advance a unifying theory of his own which he calls "synthetic analysis". Following
J. L. Mackie's distinction between conceptual, epistemological, and factual analyses heemploys
a tripartite framework devoted respectively to traditional philosophy, to psychiatry and to
neuroscience. Each section contains a detailed summary of earlier work regarded as most
relevant to the argument and thechoiceis revealingly idiosyncratic. Thuswhile Descartes, Kant,
and Hegel understandably dominate the philosophical section, the differences between
psychiatry and psychology are deemed "irrelevant" and Piaget and Freud become pre-eminent
in thesecond section. In the third section the neuro-scientific approach is represented principally
by the work of Fodor, Hubel, and Wiesel, but there is very little on the neuropsychology of
memory or of neuro-linguistics.
The "synthetic analysis" itself turns out to be an Hegelian attempt to go beyond the
phenomenology of experience by means of "a dialectical synthesis of rationalism and
empiricism". Drawn freely from the material presented in the body ofthe text, it represents an
exercise in epistemology advanced as a mode ofexplaining the possibility of the realization of
valid knowledge. The author describes it as follows: "By embedding its dialectic, not merely in
self-conscious individual experience but in biologically grounded cognitive mechanisms which
by definition apply equally to all members of the species sharing our everywhere-and-
unavoidable world, the Synthetic Analysis establishes the possibility of intersubjective
knowledge as an internal solution to the foundational problem of epistemology". If they can
understand it some readers may find the theory persuasive. Others may see it as little more than
verbose otiosity, especially as the author's expressed preference for the Kantian tradition
overshadows the insights ofLudwigWittgenstein. Forthem theTractatus Logico-Philosophicus
will contain the most appropriate comment: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be
silent".
Michael Shepherd, Institute of Psychiatry, London
PAULWILLIAMS, GREG WILKINSON, and KENNETH RAWNSLEY (eds.), Thescope of
epidemiological psychiatry: essays in honour of Michael Shepherd, London and New York,
Routledge, 1989, 8vo, pp. xiv, 536, £33.00.
The Festschrift has become an honourable tradition of twentieth-century science, wherein
contemporaries of a leading academic produce original articles around the themes that have
dominated his (usually) working life. Often such collections are workaday stuff, interleaved with
the occasional piece ofinteresting and new work. For who would hide a Nature-bound article in
the relative obscurity ofa large volume? And such collections do tend to gather more dust than
readers. Whether this present volume, in honour of Michael Shepherd, Professor of
Epidemiological Psychiatry at the Institute ofPsychiatry and The Maudsley, will go the way of
such Festschrifts is unpredictable, but I suspect its sheer detail will keep it afloat. There are
humdrum pieces here, but many are excellent summaries of the Present State of
Epidemiology-a "P.S.E." ofscientific detail that aptly reflects Michael Shepherd's work-and
references and index are extensive and useful.
Professor Shepherd himself was long renowned amongst trainee psychiatrists at The
Maudsley as a consultant to be feared. His habit of reading the medical notes while you
presented thecase was disconcerting to those expecting obvious signs ofattention; the absence of
those same notes, as a guiding source to the well-rounded psychiatric history that was expected,
led to many unsubstantiated assertions and ironic Shepherdesque smiles. This whole procedural
theatre was part of the Aubrey Lewis tradition, of searching cross-examination and public
exposure of loose thinking, that Shepherd very much represents. Some decry it, as too
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